Darrell Devere Poulson v. State of Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Darrell Devere Poulson v. State of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; Ronald N. Boyce; Attorneys for Respondent;
William G. Fowler; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Poulson v. State, No. 10208 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4690
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL DEVERE POULSON, 
Petitioner-Appellant 
-vs.- Case No. 10208 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Order of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
Honorable R. L. Tuckett, judge 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
WILLIAM G. FOWLER 
1101 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
i l I= n ~) ~ ... ~·/ . ·r.: L.itllllBI 
OCT 3 0 1964 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ---------------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
ARGUMENT ------------------- ____ ---------------- __ _ _ ___ _ ____ __ _ ___ _ ___ __ __ _ ____ ___ ___________ 7 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR 
CORAM VOBIS SINCE: 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT ANY OF 
THE PSYCHIATRISTS WHO EXAMINED THE 
PETITIONER WERE OF ANY DIFFERENT OPIN-
ION THAN THAT GIVEN AT THE TIME OF THE 
ORIGINAL TRIAL NOR WAS THERE ANY SHOW-
ING OF PERJURY, COLLUSION OR MISCON-
DUCT _________________________________________________ . ___ -------------- ____ ------------- 7 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF 77-24-17, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953, WERE COMPLIED WITH AT THE 
ORIGINAL TRIAL ------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
C. THERE IS NO SHOWING OF NEWLY DISCOV-
ERED EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD WARRANT 
THE COURT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL------------------ 11 
D. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEWLY DISCOVERED 
SO AS TO WARRANT RELIEF BY CORAM VOBIS ____ 12 
CON CL USI ON _________ -------------------------------------------------- _______ --- _____ ------ 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
31 Am. J ur. on Judgments, Sec. 802 -------------------------------------------------- 12 
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure ( 1930) -------- 11 
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section 940 ( 5) ------------------------------------------ 9 
CASES CITED 
People v. Pearson, 41 Cal. App. 2d 614, 107 P.2d 463 -------------------- 8 
State v. Woodard, 108 U. 390, 160 P.2d 432 ( 1945) ------------------ 12, 13 
United States v. Everett, 146 Fed. Supp. 54-------------------------------------- 9 
Ward v. Turner, 12 U.2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 ( 1961) ------------------------ 12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS- Continued 
Page 
STATUTES CITED 
Laws of Utah 1935, Chapter 122, Section 1 -------------------------------··-···· 11 
77-24-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953 ------------------------·--------- 7, 10, 11 
TEXTS CITED 
Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry ( 1952), page 35 ----------------------·-····-· 9 
Hardman, The Case for Eclecticism, 10 Crime and Delinquency 
201 ( 1964) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------·-- 9 
Manual for Courts-Martial ( 1951) p. 200-223; 
Executive Order 10214 ( 1951) -------------······-·······------------·-········· 9 
Shadoen, Law and Tactics in Federal Criminal Cases ( 1964) ------·- 9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL DEVERE POULSON, 
Petitioner-Appellant 
-vs.-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 10208 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant Darrell Devere Poulson was convicted of 
murder in the first degree in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Utah County, which conviction was affirmed by this 
court. Subsequently, he petitioned for a writ of coram vobis 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, and 
appeals from the dismissal of his petition. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On May 8, 1964, the petitioner filed an original writ of 
coram vobis in the District Court, Utah County, and ac-
companied the petition by an affidavit of Ija Korner, Ph.D. 
On May 13, and May 21, 1964, a hearing was held upon 
the petition and on June 5, 1964, the Honorable R. L. 
Tuckett, Judge, denied the writ of coram vobis. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the petition was properly 
denied and that the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent adopts the designation of the transcript 
of original proceedings "T" and the transcript on the peti-
tion for extraordinary relief "R" as set forth in the appel-
lant's brief. The respondent will refer to pleadings filed as 
a part of the petition for writ of coram vobis as "P." 
Respondent submits the following statement of facts. 
On Saturday, February 16, 1961, the appellant Darrell 
Devere Poulson, killed and raped Karen Mechling in 
American Fork, Utah (T. 20, Exhibit 5). The appellant's 
defense at the time of trial was a claim of insanity. The only 
evidence tending to support the testimony at the time of 
trial was offered by Mr. lja Korner, a psychologist who 
examined the appellant on one occasion for 27'2 hours dur-
ing which time he gave the appellant a few psychological 
tests (T. 362, 367, 375). Mr. Korner described the appel-
lant as having "nothing on the ball" (T. 364). He was of 
the opinion that the appellant was suffering from a mental 
illness (T. 368). He defined such a mental illness as being 
where the appellant was unable to control his impulses 
(T. 365). He did not attempt at any time to ascertain 
whether the appellant knew the difference between right 
and wrong (T. 395, 396) and could not say whether the 
appellant was aware of what he was doing at the time he 
killed and raped his victim (T. 396). Mr. Korner did not 
perform a complete I.Q. test on the appellant, but only gave 
the oral part of the Vvrechsler Bellvue Test and based upon 
that, concluded the appellant was feeble minded ( T. 364). 
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A psychologist from the Utah State Mental Hospital 
testified as to performing a complete I.Q. test and per-
sonality integration test. He also gave additional psycho-
logical tests to the appellant. He determined the appellant 
to have an I.Q. on the verbal test of 94 and on the full scale 
test of 81. He characterized the appellant's condition, based 
upon his testing, as being one of "mild mental deficiency" 
(T. 412, 413). Preceding the trial, the court appointed 
three psychiatrists to examine the appellant. They were 
Carl H. Kivler, M.D. (R. 7), Louis G. Moench (R. 27) and 
C. H. Hardin Branch (R. 43). Dr. Kivler was the State's 
nominee and Drs. Branch and Moench were appointed at 
the request of the appellant (R. 5). Dr. Kivler and Dr. 
Moench testified at the trial, but Dr. Branch was not called. 
Dr. Kivler testified that he examined the appellant on sev-
eral occasions during the month of November, 1961. He 
characterized the appellant's mental capabilities as being 
"mentally retarded in a degree as mild" (T. 421). He was 
of the opinion that the appellant knew the difference be-
tween right and wrong at the time of trial and at the time 
of the commission of the crime (T. 423). He found no 
indication of psychosis and was further of the opinion that 
the appellant knew the nature and quality of his acts and 
was capable of controlling his emotions (T. 424, 425). Dr. 
Moench, also a psychiatrist, testified that upon examination 
of the appellant, he concluded that the appellant's condi-
tion was one of "mild mental retardation" (T. 435). He 
also was of the opinion that the appellant knew the dif-
ference between right and wrong, could understand the 
charges against him, could control his impulses and knew 
the nature and seriousness of his actions (T. 437,438). Ad-
ditional evidence from various lay witnesses was received, 
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showing the appellant's condition, his background, and his 
general functioning in the community. Based upon the 
above evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
The appellant's petition for a writ of coram vobis alleged 
the appointment of the three physicians (P. 4). The appel-
lant further alleged that prior to trial that Dr. Moench, 
by letter, suggested that Drs. Branch and Kivler compare 
their testimony prior to trial to insure uniformity. The 
appellant argued that the conduct of Dr. Moench in send-
ing the letter to the other doctors was prejudicial and war-
ranted a new trial (T. 5). No claim or allegation was made 
in the petitioner's complaint that he was denied due process 
of law. The affidavit of Mr. Korner was attached which 
was generally in accordance with the petitioner's com-
plaint. Neither the affidavit nor the complaint alleged that 
there was in fact any collusion between the doctors to reach 
a result other than that which they in fact believed to be 
true or that the doctors had consulted with one another 
prior to trial for the purposes of presenting a united front or, 
further, that the doctors had not, when they testified, actu-
ally believed their testimony. Nor was there any evidence 
offered at the petitioner's coram vobis hearing which would 
support such a conclusion. At the coram vobis hearing, Dr. 
Kivler testified that he had examined the appellant ap-
proximately five to six times prior to testifying at the trial 
( R. 8). He testified that he had received a letter from Dr. 
Moench, the contents of which he did not particularly re-
call, but thought it contained Dr. Moench's evaluation of 
the case ( R. 9) . He testified that he received Dr. Moench's 
letter subsequent to his having made his own evaluation and 
having reached his own decision as to the appellant's con-
dition ( R. 9) and that from his recollection Dr. Moench 
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was generally in agreement with his evaluation (R. 11). 
Dr. Kivler did not change his opinion subsequent to re-
ceiving Dr. Moench's letter and made no changes in his re-
port concerning the appellant's condition. He made no 
effort or attempt to contact Dr. Moench subsequent to re-
ceiving the letter from him, but merely filed what he had 
received (R. 18). The communication from Dr. Moench 
had no effect upon his diagnosis ( R. 20) . 
The letter which Dr. Moench sent, which was accom-
panied by his analysis, was a copy of a clinical note to Dr. 
Hardin Branch. That letter (defendant's Exhibit "B") 
was received into evidence at the collateral hearing and 
merely suggested that Dr. Branch might find his conclu-
sions helpful and that if Dr. Branch had any serious dis-
agreements that Dr. Moench would like to hear from Dr. 
Branch. No communication of any disagreement was re-
ceived by Dr. Moench from Dr. Branch. At the coram 
vobis hearing, Dr. Moench testified that he submitted copies 
of his report to Dr. Kivler and Dr. Branch and that here-
ceived from Dr. Branch a copy of Mr. Korner's psychologi-
cal evaluation. He testified that the receipt of information 
from Dr. Branch did not change his opinion nor did it differ 
substantially from his conclusions (R. 36). He had made 
his own independent, historical evaluation of the appellant 
(R. 36). Prior to trial, he had extensive conversation with 
the defense, but none with the prosecution ( R. 38) . The 
only other communications he had with either Drs. Branch 
or Kivler was the exchange by mail with Dr. Kivler of the 
report Dr. Kivler had made, which Moench said had no in-
fluence on his opinion ( R. 40--42) . Dr. Moench testified 
that the only individual who had approached him in an 
attempt to influence his opinion was Mr. Korner and that 
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he disagreed with Mr. Korner and told him at the time he 
did not support Mr. Korner's conclusions ( R. 41). 
Dr. Hardin Branch testified at the collateral hearing that 
he did not testify at the original trial, and that the only com-
munication he had with Dr. Moench was the letter from 
Moench to him on the 30th of October 1961, with the 
accompanying reports. He testified that he examined the 
appellant himself and made an independent psychological 
evaluation (R. 49, 50). He stated that Dr. Korner had done 
some psychological testing on the appellant at his request. 
Prior to trial, Dr. Branch had conversations with the de-
fense ( R. 53) . In response to questions from the appellant's 
counsel as to whether there was a psychiatric difference be-
tween the terms "mild" or "moderate" as they may relate 
to a mental deficiency, he testified that they had no techni-
cal specificity, but were lay terms which may be used in 
identifying varying degrees of deficiency. He testified that 
it was common among psychiatrists, when called to testify 
as experts, to define amongst themselves areas of agreement 
or disagreement (R. 55). 
Mr. Korner did not testify at the collateral hearing, nor 
is there any evidence that his affidavit was received by the 
court. It is noteworthy that Mr. Korner in his affidavit in-
dicates that the letter from Dr. Moench had been exhibited 
to Father Roger Wood of St. Mary's Episcopal Church of 
Provo, Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENY-
ING THE PETITION FOR CORAM VOBIS SINCE: 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT ANY OF THE 
PSYCHIATRISTS WHO EXAMINED THE PETITIONER 
WERE OF ANY DIFFERENT OPINION THAN THAT 
GIVEN AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL TRIAL NOR 
WAS THERE ANY SHOWING OF PERJURY, COLLUSION 
OR MISCONDUCT. 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF 77-24-17, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953, WERE COMPLIED WITH AT THE ORIGI-
NAL TRIAL. 
C. THERE IS NO SHOWING OF NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD WARRANT THE COURT 
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL. 
D. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEWLY DISCOVERED SO AS 
TO WARRANT RELIEF BY CORAM VOBIS. 
A. The evidence offered at the petitioner's hearing for 
relief from the original judgment in no way demonstrated 
that either Dr. Carl H. Kivler or Dr. Louis G. Moench, the 
psychiatrists who testified at the appellant's trial, gave any 
perjured testimony, acted in collusion or otherwise testified 
contrary to their actual findings. Dr. Kivler, who made the 
most extensive examination of the appellant ( R. 8), had 
reached his own decision evaluating the appellant's case 
prior to the time he received a copy of a letter from Dr. 
Moench to Dr. Branch or any information as to Dr. 
Moench's evaluation ( R. 9) . He indicated that he did not 
change his opinion after he received Dr. Moench's letter 
and that his diagnosis generally was in agreement with Dr. 
Moench ( R. 11, 14) . He further testified that he made no 
changes in his report, nor did he attempt to contact Dr. 
Moench. The evidence demonstrates that Dr. Kivler made 
an independent evaluation and did not engage in any im-
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proper activity. The testimony of Dr. Moench was similar 
in that he indicated that he did not change his evaluation 
or opinion as a result of communications with Dr. Branch 
and that Dr. Branch's conclusions did not differ substan-
tially from his (R. 35, 36). Further, Dr. Branch and Dr. 
Moench communicated extensively with the defense coun-
sel and, therefore, there was no attempt to suppress or hide 
any evidence. The only person who attempted to influence 
any of the opinions of any of the doctors was Mr. I j a Korner 
who, by virtue of his own affidavit and disclosure of the 
letter from Dr. Moench to Dr. Branch, to an Episcopalian 
minister, appears to be more than professionally involved 
in the case. It would appear that Mr. Komer has gone 
beyond the realm of psychology and has concerned himself 
with the political and social consequences of the situation 
to the point that he has lost any objectivity. Finally, Dr. 
Branch testified that it was not uncommon for psychiatrists 
to define terms and communicate among themselves in an 
effort to better understand the problem. The appellant's 
argument that this somehow is improper, is ridiculous. It 
would be like advocating that each member of the Supreme 
Court should write a separate opinion without ever having 
discussed the case with any other member of the Supreme 
Court for fear that there might be some exchange of ideas. 
The appellant argues that an independent psychiatric 
evaluation is essential to due process. It is worth noting that 
the appellant's original petition in the trial court did not 
recite due process as any grounds for relief. However, a 
number of states adopt procedures which contemplate the 
use of psychiatric teams or batteries. In People v. Pearson, 
41 Cal. App. 2d 614, 107 P.2d 463, the court apparently 
approved a joint psychiatric report signed by appointed 
alienists. Many state procedures involve hospitalization and 
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evaluation by a team. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal LawJ Section 
940(5); United States v. EverettJ 146 Fed. Supp. 54. Pres-
ent federal procedure in the District of Columbia may, in 
the case of an indigent criminal, involve a 90-day mental 
observation procedure at St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Shadoen, 
Law and Tactics in Federal Criminal Cases (1964), page 
245. Shadoen notes that at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, a staff 
conference is held sometime during the final two to three 
weeks of the accused's stay which is "the primary diagnostic 
tool utilized by the hospital." Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry 
( 1952), page 35, also notes that a period of hospital obser-
vation may be helpful in doubtful cases in determining 
criminal responsibility. Since this is commonly a team pro-
cedure, it can hardly be claimed that it denied due process 
of law. Psychiatrists are primarily attempting to determine 
the mental condition of the appellant under admittedly 
difficult circumstances. The use of a variety of techniques, 
analyses and disciplines is probably most helpful in attempt-
ing to understand the true condition of an accused. Hard-
man, The Case for Eclecticism, 10 Crime and Delinquency 
201 ( 1964). It would be absurd to say that due process re-
quired that standard diagnostic techniques and practices 
not be used when the primary purpose for their use is to 
determine the mental condition of an individual. 
Persuasive of the fact that comparing notes and using 
other disciplines does not violate due process is the fact that 
the President has provided in the Manual for Courts-Mar-
tialJ 1951 for just such a form of psychiatric evaluation of 
an accused charged with an offense triable by court-martial. 
MCM, 1951, p. 200-223; Executive Order 10214 ( 1951 ) 
Truman. There is no merit, based on the evidence of this 
case, to the appellant's petition. 
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B. It is submitted that contrary to the appellant's con-
tention, the provisions of 77-24-17, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, were complied with and that there was no variance 
from the statutory requirements which would warrant the 
relief sought. 77-24-17 provides that upon notice of the 
defense of insanity, the court must appoint and select "two 
alienists" to examine the defendant and investigate his 
sanity. The statute further provides: 
"It is the duty of the alienists so selected and appointed 
to examine the defendant and investigate his sanity, 
and to testify whenever summoned, in any proceeding 
in which the sanity of the defendant is in question." 
The statute further provides that any alienist appointed 
may be called by either party or by the court. In the insant 
case, the trial court appointed three alienists to examine 
the appellant. Nothing in the statute prohibits the alienists 
which are appointed from examining the defendant jointly, 
considering the findings of each other, or otherwise using 
the benefit of diagnosis and conclusions of other experts. 
In fact, the statute would seem to contemplate just such 
action. The statute uses the plural "alienists" and indicates 
it is their duty to "examine the defendant and investigate 
his sanity." The investigation of insanity may well involve 
the obtaining of historical information, the consultation 
with other physicians and the use of any other appropriate 
discipline which may enable the alienists to arrive at a con-
clusion. Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, the 
statute does neither expressly nor impliedly contemplate 
that an appointed alienist must, independent of his fellow 
appointees and without the right of consultation or discus-
sion, examine and reach a conclusion. This Act was passed 
in 1935 and was based upon the American Law Institute's 
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Code of Criminal Procedure. Laws of Utah 1935, Chap-
ter 122, Section 1. See American Law Institute Code of 
Criminal Procedure (1930); IV and V Utah Bar Bulletin 
( 1935) . There is nothing in the legislative history of the 
Act or in the archives of the American Law Institute which 
would lead to the conclusion that the framers contemplated 
that appointed alienists would not be free to consult with 
one another, use one another's discoveries and endeavor to 
iron out any differences between one another which would 
lead to a correct determination of an accused's mental state. 
Indeed, many states and the federal government were using 
methods of a similar nature to that followed in the instant 
situation. It must be concluded that the major premise 
upon which the appellant bases his claim for relief is faulty 
and that 77-24-17 was in fact complied with. 
C. The testimony offered at the hearing on the petition 
for a writ of corum vobis demonstrated that each of the 
doctors who were appointed to examine the appellant testi-
fied at the trial as to their personal beliefs based upon a 
thorough professional investigation. The only evidence 
which could be deemed newly discovered would be the 
letter from Dr. Moench to Dr. Branch and the possible 
knowledge that some of the examining physicians had ac-
cess to reports and conclusions of the other physicians. It is 
clear that this is not sufficient evidence as will support a writ 
of coram nobis or coram vobis.1 
1 The writ of coram nobis and coram vobis are in fact the same writ. The dis-
~inction at common law was dependent upon the jurisdiction of the court issu-
Ing the writ. The writ of coram nobis was issued by the King's Bench, whereas 
the writ of coram vobis was issued by the Court of Common Pleas. See Frank, 
Corum Nobis, Section 1.02 ( 1953) ; Rolle, Henry-Abridgement ( 1668) 746, 
747. The correct designation in Utah is writ of coram nobis. Neal v. Beck-
stead, 3 U.2d 403, 285 P.2d 129 ( 1955) ; State v. Woodard, 108 U. 390, 160 
P.2d432 (1945). 
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In State v. Woodard, this court stated: 
"A writ of coram nobis, where available, seeks to 
obtain a review of a judgment on the ground that cer-
tain mistakes of fact have occurred which were un-
known to the court and to the parties affected, and that 
but for such mistakes the judgment would not have 
been rendered. 31 Am. Jur. on Judgments, Sec. 802; 
State v. Richardson, 291 Mo. 566, 237 S. W. 765; 
Alexander v. State, 20 Wyo. 241, 123 P. 68, Ann. Cas. 
1915A, 1282. * * *" 
In Ward v. Turner, 12 U.2d 310,366 P.2d 72 ( 1961), the 
petitioner sought a special writ from the Third District 
Court. The court in rejecting the petition stated: 
"We conclude that the judgment must be reversed 
for lack of substantial evidence which would reason-
ably indicate that had the evidence * * * been dis-
closed to defendant before trial, he would probably 
have been acquitted." 
The applicable standard appears to be that a writ of 
coram nobis will lie if the evidence which is claimed to be 
newly discovered is of sufficient consequence that it would 
be highly probable that had the evidence been disclosed, 
the jury would not have returned the same verdict. An 
analysis of the evidence in the instant case shows that it is 
far below the standard required for relief by coram nobis. 
The evidence in no way would have affected the result 
among reasonable men. The evidence did not tend to sup-
port the appellant's contention at trial and could have had 
little effect, if any, on the conduct of the trial itself. 
D. It is a well established rule that a writ of coram nobis 
will not lie if the so-called newly discovered evidence could 
have been discovered by the use of reasonable diligence. 
In the insant case, defense counsel had numerous contacts 
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with the psychiatrists involved (defendant's Exhibit "A"). 
Appellant could, if he had so desired, called Dr. Branch at 
his original trial. The evidence relating to the communica-
tions between the examining physicians was readily avail-
able and a few questions more or less could easily have 
elicited the information. Thus, in State v. Woodard, 108 
U. 390, 160 P.2d 432 ( 1945), this court observed: 
"* * * However, for a party to be entitled to this writ 
it must appear that the failure to present the facts to 
the court was not due to any negligence or fault of the 
party seeking the writ. As stated in 31 Am. Jur. on 
Judgments, Sec. 806: 
'It is essential to the availability of the remedy of 
coram nobis or coram vobis that the mistake of fact 
relied upon for relief was unknown to the applicant 
at the time of the trial, and could not by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence have been discovered by him 
in time to have been presented to the court, unless 
he was prevented from so doing by duress, fear, or 
other sufficient cause, so that it was by no negligence 
or other fault of his that the matter was not made to 
appear at the former trial. * * *' 
See also State v. Richardson, supra; Alexander v. 
State, supra; State v. Boyd, 117 Neb. 320, 220 N. W. 
281,58 A. L. R. 1283. 
"In the instant case the mistake of fact upon which 
the appellant relies is the value of the property stolen. 
The articles stolen were one Seiberling 6-ply heavy 
duty 625-16 air cushion tire, rim and tube and two 
Gates Valee tires, 6-ply heavy duty 625-16 rims and 
tires. It is apparent that these articles are of the type 
the value of which was readily ascertainable. The 
value of these articles at the time they were stolen 
could have been discovered with very little effort on 
the part of the defendant. His failure to do so and to 
call the court's attention to the fact that their value 
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was less than $50, if that were so at that time, was 
clearly negligence and therefore the court did not err 
in refusing to grant the writ." 
The same rule is applicable in the instant case since with 
very little effort the information which the appellant con-
tends is newly discovered could have been discovered at 
trial. The evidence was in existence at the time of trial, was 
within knowledge of persons who testified at the trial or 
within the possession of persons with whom the appellant's 
counsel had discussed the case. Consequently, it does not 
appear that the so-called newly discovered evidence was in 
fact evidence which could not have been discovered with 
the use of reasonable diligence. The petition for coram 
nobis was properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was given every consideration at the time 
of trial, was afforded a full review on appeal by this court, 
and certiorari has been denied by the United States Su-
preme Court. The petition for extraordinary relief now 
before this court on appeal is merely the common delaying 
tactic normally associated with cases where the capital 
penalty has been imposed. There is no merit to the appeal. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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